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This work project studies the variation in female candidates for Brazilian city 
council elections. Using cross-sectional data for two election years, the 
impact of cultural, socio-economic and political variables is measured, 
followed by a calculation of the optimal values of the variable under study 
according to three interests: parties’ electoral results, male candidates’ 
electoral results and female candidates’ electoral results. We find that, 
though the first set of variables is significant, it explains only a small part, 
but average values of female candidates on parties’ lists are apparently 
converging to male’s optimum, suggesting that incumbents interests are 
dominating nominations.  
 
Keywords: Women’s representation; Gender Quotas; Nomination; Brazil. 
 
* I would like to thank my advisor, Professor José Tavares, for all his support, and Professor Paulo Arvate for the data provided. 
 
I. Introduction 
“No written law has ever been more binding than unwritten custom supported by popular 
opinion.” Carrie C. Catt, Speech at the Senate on woman's suffrage, February 13, 1900. 
In an effort to fight the under-representation of women in elected political offices, 
numerous countries have been discussing the implementation of affirmative actions as a 
3 
 
strategy to increase women’s participation
1
. In Brazil, legislative gender quotas were 
established in 1995, in all proportional representation elections, but the percentage of 
women nominated remained below what was stipulated. While legislation may be 
responsible for the overall lack of quota fulfillment
2
, the fact that there were some lists 
where women were in the majority calls for further investigation. 
In this work project we will focus on the 2000 and 2004 Brazilian municipal elections 
for city councils. Both  elections occurred under the same quota legislation and our goal is 
to understand i) which factors are influencing the probability of a woman being a candidate 
ii) what is the relation between the increase of women on parties’ lists and electoral results.  
Some characteristics render the study of Brazilian elections particularly interesting. 
First, the country’s dimension, constituted by 5562 municipalities with a wide range of 
sizes (the biggest one, São Paulo, had a population of 10,434,252 in 2009) ,with 
heterogeneity in cultural and socio-economic dimensions, and quite different results in 
terms of nominated and elected women, provide us enough variance to give consistency to 
our study.  Secondly, it is one of the few countries in the world with an “open-list” system. 
This system creates an interesting dynamic by giving a smaller role for parties concerning 
who is elected (increasing the importance of variables capturing voter’s perception of 
candidates gender) and by potentiating intra-party competition. These aspects require 
different approaches to women’s representation under gender quotas.  
                                                          
1 According to Krooks (2007) more than one hundred countries are, at least, discussing the use of some form of quotas to increase the 
selection of female candidates to political office. America Latina case is remarkable, with the introduction of gender quotas in eleven 
countries, though with great differences among them (Htun, 2005). 
2 Examining the context of quota’s approval and the ratified text, it is fair to select legislation design as the major responsible for the poor 
outcome as the law is written in such a way that it becomes non-enforceable. It allowed parties not to follow quotas without suffering any 
type of sanction, what explains the low contestation of the approval of the legislation, indicating that quotas have been passed merely as a 
symbolic gesture (Araújo, 2001). 
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Existing analyses are mainly on quota’s impact and comparisons with other countries 
but, more recently, interest shifted to the relation between a range of variables and electoral 
results, according to gender. District magnitude is reported as having a negative impact on 
women’s election, increases in the percentage of female candidates appear positively 
related to female’s electoral results, and socio-economic indicators are found to have a low, 
and sometimes even negative, impact on women’s election (Alves and Cavenaghi, 2005; 
Araújo and Alves, 2007). Since the legislative quota falls on the percentage of nominated, 
not elected, and given that the Brazilian electoral rules would appear to facilitate women’s 
inclusion (due to the large spectrum of candidates allowed), we are led to believe strategic 
reasoning is an important factor behind nomination. Considering that obstacles for 
women’s nomination may be quite different from those of their election, we have mentally 
separated the process in three main stages: recruitment (or pre-nomination status); inclusion 
on party lists; and electoral results
3
. In this work project our interest is in the nomination 
stage, but all stages will be considered due to their interdependence. Results show that this 
separation was correct as some socio-economic variables that had a negative influence on 
elections have actually had a positive impact on nomination. 
Until now we have seen why quota failed to succeed and have set as our work project 
goal to understand what causes variation in women’s nomination across municipalities and 
parties. Since variables influencing such variation come from distinct areas
4
 and affect 
women’s nomination through different channels - namely women’s qualifications and 
                                                          
3 Inspired by Rule, 1981. 
4 A common ground is to have the vast universe of factors affecting women’s representation divided in at least three categories: cultural, 
socio-economic and political (within the political category, sub-divisions like electoral system or parties’ political culture are used). 
However, the variety of factors determining women’s representation within these categories is so abundant that we are forced to discuss 
just briefly some issues, recognizing that behind each of them there are quite interesting ramifications and that some other aspects are left 
unmentioned.   
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willingness to stand for elections, party support, and electorate openness - we have divided 
our work in the following steps. First, we will discuss current know-how on electoral 
systems and women’s representation and discuss the Brazilian case, particularly the “open-
list” consequences since this factor marks our work structure. Moving to the analysis per se, 
we assume that beyond political, cultural and socio-economic determinants, nominations 
will also be influenced by expectations parties have on electoral outcomes. With that in 
mind, we begin with an introduction and posterior analysis of the influence of the first set 
of variables in women’s nomination. Then, we study how different proportions of women 
on parties’ lists affects electoral results, calculating optimal proportions of female 
candidates. This permits us to understand what the demand was, subject to the specific 
candidate supply. As a final step, we compare the optimal values with the averages 
observed for both years. Using information from these three analyses we draw our 
conclusions and suggest new lines of work. 
II. Electoral system and women’s representation 
In Brazil, the proportional system is used in city council elections
5
. In spite of the system 
itself being constant for the whole country, variations across municipalities can be captured 
by considering changes in the totality of seats (district magnitude). A higher number of 
seats should be more conducive to women’s representation (Matland and Brown, 1992; 
Rule, 1987), though some scholars find less consistent relations (Matland, 1993; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2005). There are two types of justifications for these differentiated results. One 
considers that what is important is not the number of seats in the municipality but the ones 
                                                          
5 It is well reported that multi-member proportional representation (PR) system is more favorable to women’s election than single-
member district majority and plurality system. See for example: Matland and Brown, 1992; Norris, 1985, 1996; Rule, 1981, 1987; 
Matland, 1998; McAllister and Studlar, 2002; Paxton et al., 2010. 
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the party is expecting to win, as the gender dispute is internal.
6
 The other set of 
explanations is related with changes brought by higher district magnitudes that can be 
prejudicial to women
7
, such as changes in recruitment process (Schmidt, 2003). If costs of 
campaigning increase with district magnitude, women may be disproportionally affected 




Moving to the effects of the “open-list”, it is debatable whether this system is more or 
less favorable to women’s representation. This will depend on a range of variables, and 
evidence holds for both cases, but the bottom line idea is: if women’s biggest obstacle is 
encountered in the ballots, then the “open-list” system is worse; if the biggest obstacle is 
found in the relation with parties, the “open-list” will help women (Matland, 1998). 
Nonetheless, such obstacles can still be overcome in the “closed-list” case if the legislation 
design is appropriate and mandatory, namely through the introduction of placement 
mandates like the “zipper quota” where men and women need to be alternated in list 
positions or by relating quota to winnable slots
9
. When quotas are voluntary, or penalties 
are not sufficiently high, uncovering party’s motivation is of utmost importance, both for 
closed or “open-list” systems. 
III. Brazilian city council elections 
In city council elections, the district magnitude varies according to population, ranging 
from 9 to 55 seats. The number of candidates that parties are allowed to present 
                                                          
6 This variable, although related to district magnitude, also depends on factors such as the distribution of the vote and the rules for 
allocating seats among parties (Schmidt, 2003) 
7 Davidson-Schmich (2006) finds a negative relation between party’s adherence to quota and the number of citizens per direct mandate, 
supporting the idea that women may have increased difficulties in larger districts. 
8 The uneven distribution of income in Brazil is also mentioned in the following consulted papers: Araújo e Alves, 2007; Lima, 2009. 
9 For a good example of changes brought by altering legislation, we recommend the Argentina and Costa Rica cases (Jones, 1998, 2004).  
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corresponds to 150% of the seats
10
. Quota legislation stipulates that 30% of those places 
should either be filled by women or left in blank
11
. The “open-list” characteristic means 
that the list of candidates presented to voters is completely unordered. At the election stage, 
each voter has one vote and votes either for one specific candidate or for the party itself. 
The totality of votes for the party and candidates of the party is then used to decide 
allocation of seats among parties, and those seats are given to the candidates who have 
received more votes within the respective party (coalition).
12
 
IV. Strategy behind nomination? 
From the process described, two things are worthy of mention: the large range of 
candidates allowed and the lack of power parties have over which candidates are elected. 
The first factor may facilitate the nomination but, as parties lose control over who is 
elected, list composition must anticipate the possible outcomes of intra-party competition.
13
 
It is our assumption that parties have at least two major interests: one is to maximize 
electoral results, meaning that more support will be given to women candidates if they are 
perceived to be a good “bet”; other is the recognition of vested interests and limited 
positions to offer, what creates a certain rivalry between genders, as having more women 
nominated/elected usually means taking seats away from male incumbents. In the Brazilian 
case it is not plausible that women are not nominated in order to reserve places for men on 
the lists. It would apparently even be positive to include the maximum candidates allowed, 
                                                          
10  200% in a coalition. In both cases, if the number of seats for deputy chamber is equal or lower than 20, the maximum percentage 
allowed increases by 50 pp. We note that these values where lower when the 20% quota was introduced in 1995 but, in 1997, were 
increased, together with the passage of quota percentage to 30%. 
11 To be more precise, legislation stipulates that, of the maximum number of candidates allowed, each party should reserve between 30% 
and 70% for each gender.  
12 The Brazilian electoral system rules create considerable disproportionality, especially due to the rules of distribution of seats in 
coalitions. The way the blank ballot is accounted and the lack of perfect relation between proportion of citizens and proportion of seats 
further contribute to the high observed disproportionality (Tafner, 1996; Nicolau and Schmitt, 1995). 
13 Note that, on average, only one candidate from each party is elected. This means that the competition for the seat is high. Furthermore, 
the open list system increases the competition within the party. 
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at least to get more votes, which is not usually done. We assume that gatekeepers
14
 measure 
the trade-offs from having more candidates, and more votes, with the possibility of 
reducing some candidate’s probability of success or the perceived quality of the party list, 
decreasing the number of votes going to the party.
15
  
 The lack of control over elected candidates adds more uncertainty to which factors are 
making women more or less likely to be nominated. First, we do not know whether voters 
favour men over women, the reverse, or if they do not care about candidates’ gender at all. 
But, even if they do care, how do those votes interact with changes in female candidates? 
At a first sight, it seems evident that when voters prefer female candidates their provision 
should increase, but, accounting for other interests, the situation may change. Fréchette et 
al. (2007) present a model where, if men have better chances when competing against 
women, they may be willing to have some female candidates in their party to improve their 
own electoral chances. This means we not only need to assess how voters react to female 
candidates but also how parties respond to this reaction. 
Which brings us to the next question: how do voters feel about candidate’s gender? It is 
commonly assumed that women face a higher challenge at the ballots simply due to their 
gender. There are indeed authors that find evidence of such bias when controlling for some 
characteristics such as incumbency, age, education and other biographical information 
(Fréchette et al, 2007). For others, women appear to be popular among voters (Schmidt, 
2003). Dolan (2004) concludes that candidate gender does not affect all voters the same 
                                                          
14 Party member responsible for the candidates selection. 
15 This would be similar to the corporate cannibalism when introducing products. New products can increase market share but can also 
compete with other incumbent products of the same company. Therefore, only when marginal benefits exceed marginal costs should 
these be launched. We did not find a study on these trade-offs or mechanism behind list elaboration, although Nicolau (2006), while 
discussing the electoral “open-list” system in Brazil, does raise the following question: are parties not using all seats available as a 
strategy or due to unavailability of citizens to become candidates?  
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way, but instead depends on candidates’, as well as electorate, characteristics. This 
motivates us to relate women’s nomination probability to characteristics of the municipality. 
V. Data and Methodology 
Our approach follows four steps: first, the percentage of female candidates is regressed on 
political, cultural and socio-economic variables; second, introducing the strategic factor, the 
electoral results are regressed on the percentage of female nominated (plus the previous 
explanatory variables as controls); we then calculate the optimal points; and finally 
compare them to observed averages.  
The analysis is based on data from the 2000 and 2004 Brazilian city council elections, 
plus on characteristics of the municipalities and parties for those years. Specifically, each 
observation corresponds to party   in municipality   at year   (103,040 observations16). As 
explanatory variables we use: district magnitude; an indicator of leftist ideology; religion; 
and socio-economic variables. However, as unobserved effects are expected - namely 
cultural differences across regions and differences across parties’ practices
17
 - we include 
year, party and region dummies to capture those unobserved effects (reflected in the 
dummies coefficients). With this specification we can use OLS. Description of how each 
variable was collected can be found in Appendix A. 
Leftist ideology is included since leftist parties are sometimes seen as more favourable 
to women’s representation (Caul, 2001) and there is evidence of that relation in Brazilian 
federal elections (Araújo and Alves, 2007). Religion is measured using the percentage of 
population that is Catholic and Protestant, inspired by Davidson-Schmich (2006) who finds 
                                                          
16 There are missing values on some variables regarding municipality characteristics.   
17 Some examples are: recruitment processes, support given to women on campaigns, women well positioned in the party, specific 
strategies followed by the party; elites’ power; etc. (Caul, 2001). 
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Catholicism to have a negative impact on party’s adherence to quotas, which is consistent 
with previous studies
18
. Regarding socio-economic indicators, though their importance is 
well accepted, there are no clear guidelines on which should be used. We have included the 
following variables: 
- GDP pc: under the hypothesis that the higher the economic status of the municipality, 
the higher women’s representation should be (Rule, 1981; Matland, 1998); 
- Average schooling per gender: given that results show that measures of education do 
influence women’s representation (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris, 1985; Rule, 
1981, 1987; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005), despite showing less consistent results than 
measures of women in the workforce. 
- Percentage of women in the municipality: can either reflect a higher pool of 
candidates (in a very raw sense given that qualifications are not considered) or be 
used by the parties as an instrument of decision on the number of women that should 
be included on lists (under the popular belief that women may be less reluctant to vote 
for female candidates). Note that we are not advocating that this pattern does exist.  
On the contrary, evidence points to no specific support from women towards female 
candidates (Sigelman and Welch, 1984; Darcy and Schramm, 1977) - at least between 
white voters and candidates
19
. Miguel and Queiroz (2006) find a negative relation 
between this variable and the percentage of elected women in Brazil.  
                                                          
18 Catholic societies are seen as being less supportive of the “modern” role of women and their participation in public life whereas 
Protestant societies are regarded as “more open to gender equality in government”, Schwindt-Bayer (2005). 
19 Discussion on how support to candidates according to gender may also be affected due to their race or ethnics may in fact be important 
for Brazil, as evidences signal that race may create a stronger “bond” between electorate and candidates than gender (Sigelman and 
Welch,1984), but is out of the scope of this work project. 
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- Measures of state of (and public expenditure in) health and education: are included 
for two different reasons
20
. One is to test the hypothesis that women may become 
more desirable for voters when municipality characteristics require more investment 
in “feminine specialties”, namely education and health (Sapiro, 1982; Khan, 1996; 
Finamore and Carvalho, 2006). Specifically, women’s recruitment is expected to 
increase as expenditures on social welfare issues, such as education and health, 
increase (Welch, 1978; Rule, 1981), and we hypothesize that, when indicators from 
these areas are worse, therefore requiring larger investments, demand for women will 
also increase. The other reason is that better socio-economic indicators are usually 
associated with increases in women’s representation, as previously discussed. The 
first hypothesis is related with the demand whereas the second should better reflect 
the supply side. 
A. Explaining the variance in the percentage of candidates that are women 
Firstly, the aforementioned set of variables is used on the following linear regressions
21
:  
(1)             ∑     
  
    , where z are the explanatory variables and Candfem is 
the percentage of female candidates on party list 
(2)        ∑     
  
    , where z are the explanatory variables and I1=1 if Candfem>0 
(Women Representation Indicator) 
(3)        ∑     
  
    , where z are the explanatory variables and I2=1 if 
Candfem>30% (Quota Indicator) 
                                                          
20 We recognize some problems in this approach, particularly measurement errors as they will not reflect precisely the state of health and 
education of the municipalities. 
21 We assume that these variables can impact women’s nomination through three interdependent channels – women’s decision to become 
candidates, parties’ openness to women and electorate reaction to female candidates – but will assess only their aggregate impact. 
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Results (Table 1) show that district magnitude has a positive impact on the change from 
zero to at least one woman on a party’s list but a negative impact on increases in proportion 
of women and on quota’s observance. Since our dependent variable is a proportion, in 
which the denominator is allowed to increase according to the district magnitude, we ran 
the same regression but with the number of female candidates as the dependent variable 
(Table B-3 in Appendix B). In that regression the impact of district magnitude was positive, 
so on average, the number of female candidates increases with district magnitude, but 
diminishes proportionally. 
TABLE 1—OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (1) 
 
 
Controlling for parties specific effects, left ideology parties are actually, on average, less 
likely to nominate women (when significant). Catholicism is associated with a lower 
Independent Variables Women Representationa Percentage of Female Candidates Quotab 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
District Magnitude 0.0111*** 0.0089*** -0.1022*** -0.1533*** -0.0050*** -0.0064*** 
GDP pc 0.0013*** 0.0019*** 0.0425** 0.0843*** 0.0008* 0.0013** 
Average Schooling (M) ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Average Schooling (F)  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Percentage of Women  0.0109*** 0.0197*** 0.5320*** 0.5579*** 0.0070*** 0.0062** 
Percentage of Catholics  -0.0034*** -0.0022*** -0.1073*** ns -0.0012** -0.0012** 
Percentage of Protestants  ns ns -0.0771* ns ns ns 
Student per teacher 0.0031*** 0.0057*** 0.0662*** 0.0975*** ns 0.0018*** 
Vaccine pc ns ns 0.8884* ns 0.0230*** ns 
Infant Mortality pc ns -43.5165*** -880* ns -18.265* ns 
Expenditure in Education 
pc 
ns ns 0.0007* ns 0.0000** ns 
Expenditure in Health pc ns ns 0.0007* ns -0.0000* ns 
Ideology – Left -0.3186*** ns ns -4.4138** ns ns 
Region = Northeast -0.0612*** -0.0424*** ns ns ns ns 
Region = North 0.0254* 0.0283* ns ns ns 0.0266* 
Region = Southeast 0.0315** 0.0276** ns ns -0.0237** ns 
Region = South ns -0.0317** -1.1605* -1.2889* -0.0283** ns 
Constant  0.0230 -0.5268*** 3.1135 -0.8543 0.0704 0.1190 
Number of Observations 37798 39894 37798 39894 37798 39894 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0556 0.0493 0.0068 0.0043 0.0098 0.0040 
Notes: Results for party dummies coefficients and for the same regressions without party dummies can be found in Appendix B, as 
well as results with the standard errors.  
Source:  Sources of used variables are included in Appendix A. 
a Indicator variable equal to one when percentage of female candidates is higher than zero. 
b Indicator variable equal to one when percentage of female candidates is higher than thirty, the established by quota. 




proportion of nominated women, but municipalities with a higher percentage of Protestants 
do not significantly impact women’s inclusion. 
The hypothesis of increases in demand for women when expenditures in health and 
education are higher fails to be proven, but noteworthy is the importance that the measures 
of state of health and education have on women’s nomination. Whether this is due to 
previous experiences with women in command (e.g. as mayors) or due to the plausible  
relation between society’s development and women’s position, is out of the scope of this 
research, however, as GDP pc has also a positive impact, the last hypothesis seems to hold. 
Anyhow, we do highlight the increased importance of this sort of variable in explaining 
continuous changes in proportion of women nominated, rather than in explaining discrete 
changes on specific barriers
22
. The same holds for the percentage of women in the 
municipality which has a (surprisingly) high impact on our main dependent variable.  
Dummies controlling differences among regions that are not captured by our variables 
are far more relevant when it comes to explaining the non-inclusion of women than in 
explaining variations in the percentage of included candidates, where only the South 
Region has a significant impact (negative) on women’s nomination. 
Although the model is significant we should highlight its drawbacks. First of all, some 
explanatory variables sign varies when using non-linear models, which may be caused by 
non-linear effects of our variables that change particularly in the tails of the distribution
23
. 
Secondly, and more important, is the low coefficient of determination, indicating that this 
                                                          
22 It is interesting to see that, in the forthcoming analysis, where these variables are used as controls, their sign tends to change, in the 
directions pointed by existing studies where socio-economic variables have a negative impact on the proportion of elected female. 
23 As an example, district magnitude has a positive impact in logit models, except when quota indicator is the dependent variable. In our 
linear model we have seen that the impact of district magnitude is positive in explaining having at least one woman and negative 
afterwards. This difference in the effect occurs at the tails of the distribution. 
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model does not provide a good understanding of what is driving the choice of female 
candidates
24
.  Still, when we combine the results of this analysis with the ones from the 
following analysis on the relation between female candidates and electoral results, we are 
able to understand where the problem is. We will see that though pure parity is not optimal, 
supply of candidates could, on average, increase with benefits for the party and, sometimes, 
even with benefits for male candidates. This suggests that the problem lies in the supply 
side, which is consistent with our model’s explanatory power, since we lack variables 
capturing variations in the supply side. Additionally, the variables included in the model 
that do explain variations in nomination reflect, although indirectly, variations in the supply 
side. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that those variables are either not relevant or 
have different signs in explaining electoral results.   
B. Candidate’s gender and electoral results - Optimal list composition by gender 
The study of electorate reaction to female candidates on parties’ lists is done using the 
previous set of variables as controls. Three dependent variables – Party Success (seats won 
by the party over district magnitude); Elected Males (the percentage of party elected that 
are male); and Elected Females (the percentage of party elected that are female) – are 
regressed on female candidates (%) and its square (plus controls). Results are first 
discussed for the overall data, and then presented according to regions and ideologies, 
separated by election years to capture evolution. Knowing how supply of women 
candidates was absorbed by the electorate enables us to assess the demand according to 
                                                          
24 It is however in line with similar analysis on the Brazilian elections from Araújo and Alves, 2007. Additionally, when we regress the 





, and the optimal amount that should be supplied. These will be revealed optima, 
since we do not know the true functions. We find that the percentage of female candidates 
and its square are both significant, suggesting that the gender composition of the list is not 
irrelevant. Initial increases of women are always positive. 
TABLE 2—OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (2) 
Independent variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of Female Candidates 0.4690*** 0.3689*** 0.5219*** 0.4450*** 0.2674*** 0.2160*** 
(Percentage of Female Candidates)2 -0.0104*** -0.0084*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0037*** -0.0028*** 
District Magnitude 0.4732*** 0.6669*** ns 0.1072** -0.3134*** -0.0983*** 
GDP pc -0.1141*** -0.1430*** -0.0450** ns -0.0221* -0.0214* 
Average Schooling (M) ns ns ns -2.9894* ns -1.5012* 
Average Schooling (F)  ns ns ns 3.0424* ns 1.6847* 
Percentage of Women  -0.9667*** -1.4002*** -0.2514** -0.6232*** -0.3499*** -0.4280*** 
Percentage of Catholics  0.2326*** 0.1562*** 0.0436* 0.0599** 0.0971*** 0.0726*** 
Percentage of Protestants  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Student per teacher -0.1733*** -0.3317*** -0.0481** -0.0468* -0.1160*** -0.1240*** 
Vaccine pc ns ns ns ns -0.6470*** -0.9414*** 
Infant Mortality pc 2600*** 2900** ns 1400** 1300*** 1300*** 
Expenditure in Education pc ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Expenditure in Health pc ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Ideology – Left 14.5535*** 13.2106*** ns ns ns 1.17218** 
Region = Northeast 2.9076** 2.6619* ns 1.0562* 1.4464*** 0.9157*** 
Region = North ns ns ns ns -0.6891* ns 
Region = Southeast ns ns -10897* -1.5433*** -0.8327*** -0.6525** 
Region = South ns 2.8733** ns ns ns 0.7949** 
Constant  29.3345*** 72.9934*** 6.0576 22.0794*** 15.6791*** 20.2707*** 
Observations 37798 39894 37798 39894 37798 39894 
Adjusted R2 0.1832 0.1555 0.0913 0.0899 0.2529 0.2007 
 
We use the regression coefficients as estimates in the following equations, to derive optimal 
points: 
                                                          
25 This demand is subject to the specific candidates in the data and cannot therefore be extrapolated to more general results regarding 
gender without some care. 
Notes: Party dummies are used as controls but their coefficient is not shown in the table (see Appendix B). 
Source: Data sources can be found in Appendix A as well as results without controls in Appendix B. 
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 percent level, * Significant at the 5 percent level 
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(4)                          
  ∑     
  
     ,  where z are the controls 
(5) 
  
         
                 
                % 
Using our aggregate data, we find that having an equal amount of female and male 
candidates is not beneficial for the party, but the percentage of candidates that maximizes a 
party’s electoral result (37.3%) is higher than the percentage required by quota legislation 
(30%). As for women’s electoral success, it increases until around ¾ of the list are female. 
After that, increases are no longer beneficial, given that the party loses seats. Male 
candidates, as previously seen, do gain from having some women among the competition, 
but no more than around 22.5%. To sum up, having at least one woman on the list is 
apparently a win-win situation but, after that increases in the proportion of female 
candidates will eventually hinder party, and especially male candidate’s results. 
Most of the impact of control variables on elected females appears to come from the 
effect these variables have on seats won by the party (e.g. due to re-distribution of seats if 
they increase competition) and are contrary to the impact found on nomination. This 
indicates that the impact on nomination comes from the supply side, and is not necessarily 
related to electoral results. Average schooling of females in the municipality is significant 
for the first time, having a positive impact on the proportion of seats won by the party. 
Separating optimal points by election year (figure 1 and table 3) we see that the demand 
for women is increasing, so parties should have a higher proportion of women on their lists. 
Male candidates would, however, desire a smaller number of women than on the previous 
election showing that when it comes to gender competition, women are gaining territory. 





D. Optimal list composition by gender - How far are we? 
When we add information on the actual average of female candidates (%) for both years we 
are able to understand  if, on average, supply of candidates is matching demand, whose 
function is being optimized and if we are or not approaching optimal points.  
As we have seen, in terms of electoral results, it is a win-win situation to have at least 
one woman on a party’s list. Still, the percentage of observations without any woman has 
increased for the second election (see figure 2). Strategic reasoning would not back up such 
an increase, and we conclude that it must be a supply problem. Either the restriction comes 
from lack of qualified women (or lack of qualified women willing to run) or from parties’ 
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FIGURE 1. FEMALE CANDIDATES’ IMPACT ON ELECTORAL RESULTS 
Notes: The graphic displays the functions to maximize, separated by election years. We are interested in which percentage of female 
candidates maximizes electoral results, not on these results per se, and so present the graphic starting at any point c (zero in the 
vertical axis). 





TABLE 3— PARTIAL AND AGGREGATE OPTIMAL VALUES AND REAL VALUES OF FEMALE CANDIDATES’ PERCENTAGE ON LISTS, BY YEAR 

















Region         
Centre 21.66 59.98 36.47 19.22 21.73 72.24 37.22 21.18 
Northeast 16.10 75.12 36.00 18.40 22.18 86.61 38.37 21.32 
North 24.52 62.61 38.55 20.09 13.05 68.15 34.93 21.81 
Southeast 26.29 60.37 35.71 18.30 25.96 68.18 37.28 21.53 
South 25.71 73.91 38.02 16.92 16.78 69.56 38.21 19.34 
Ideology         
Centre 17.21 73.88 35.13 18.02 18.19 83.34 36.96 20.57 
Undifferentiated 30.85 61.97 36.86 20.57 26.54 81.88 39.25 23.22 
Left 27.45 67.77 36.37 18.41 25.12 80.67 37.76 20.85 
Right 19.26 75.41 34.74 18.08 17.56 81.55 36.08 20.68 
Non-segmented 22.55 68.67 36.14 18.33 21.96 76.72 38.57 21.10 
Notes: Observed average is the actual average of the observations. All values are percentages. 
Source: Data sources description can be found in Appendix A. 
Although the optimum for the party in general is changing (growth rate=6.72%) as well as 



















Female Candidates (%) 
2000
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FIGURE 2. EVOLUTION OF FEMALE CANDIDATES’ PERCENTAGE ON LISTS  
Sources: Data sources description can be found in Appendix A. 
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rate (g=15.17%) and convergence towards male optimum seems to be in place. Major 
drawbacks are parties/municipalities presenting zero female candidates which drastically 
pull the average down
26
. Contrary to what was thought, the growth rate of female 
candidates in Brazil was quite high once we excluded observations with no women at all.  
 
 
Applying the same methodology according to regions (table 3 and figure 3) we still see 
that the percentage of females on parties’ lists is, on average, approaching the male 
optimum. It would be important to understand why the party optimum decreased in some 
cases, as it may be a reflex of the perceived quality of the candidates. Regarding ideology, 
though differences were mitigated between elections, right-wing parties most beneficial 
proportion of women is below average, suggesting that either parties with such ideology 
present female candidates that are less appealing to the electorate or that the right-wing 
electorate is less open to women on parties’ lists. Variation of party optimum across regions 
and ideologies is much lower than that of female and male optima. Thus, we are more 
confident in the optimal value for the party, than on how those seats will be distributed 
among genders. 
                                                          
26 Averages are 18.32% and 21.10%, for 2000 and 2004 (growth rate is 15.17%). Averages excluding cases where there are no female 
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Male Optimum (2000) Male Optimum (2004) Female Optimum (2000) Female Optimum (2004)
FIGURE 3. OPTIMAL VALUES PER GENDER (PER YEAR & PER REGION)  
Sources: Optimal values from table 3. 
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Electoral results are undoubtedly affected by a variety of factors other than the percentage 
of candidates presented, some of them were controlled, others not, explaining the 
disparities across observations. Nonetheless, we can observe in Figure 2 that, between the 
two elections, there was an increase in observations close to male candidates’ optimum and 
party’s optimum, indicating that those who compose the list do take into account 
incumbents and party’s goals. 
VI. Conclusion 
From our work we can draw some conclusions for policy development. First of all, when 
attempting to work on factors aiming at an increase in women’s representation, the current 
situation of women should be clearly understood. Different strategies must be drawn 
depending on whether the question at hand is how to have at least one woman or if it is to 
increase the current proportion. Whereas in the first case strong barriers exist, which appear 
to be caused mainly by problems in the supply, either due to restrictions from the parties or 
to lack of qualified women willing to run for elections, in the second, parties seem to have 
taken into consideration expectations regarding women’s electoral success and respond 
positively to them. At the same time, the first barrier appears to be highly dependent on 
regional characteristics and parties’ ideologies, whereas in the second case it is more 
dependent on religion, socio-economic development, district magnitude and demography. 
New studies should focus on uncovering through which channels and why these socio-
economic determinants are affecting women’s nomination in Brazil, and action should be 
focused directly on those specific factors. At the same time, as our work shows, obstacles in 
nomination are different from those in election. We believe that the intersection between 
these two should be considered when developing policies. 
21 
 
Evidence shows that there is still room for improvement in women’s representation 
without harm for the parties, but at some point with prejudice for male candidates what, in 
cases where male incumbents are powerful enough, can lead to a sub-optimal amount of 
women candidates. It seems counter-intuitive that, on average, quota is not being met and 
that at the same time optimum levels for the party are above 30%. However, once we 
counted only the cases with representation, growth rates were high and average values were 
above quota. 
Interesting directions would be to include variables capturing variations in the supply 
side, either in women’s qualifications for political offices
27
 or in women’s strength and 
position within the parties. Information on existence and strength of women’s movements 
across regions would also be a plus, as would be remuneration gaps according to gender 
and measures of women in the workforce. Since city councils’ remuneration is not equal 
among municipalities, we could think of models where differences in office remuneration, 
together with remuneration in workforce according to gender, could be related to increases 
in gender competition for political offices.  Additionally, we feel that particularly in the 
Brazilian case, corruption could be introduced as some studies indicate that there may be a 
correlation between gender and corruption (Azfar, 2001). Other possible interaction would 
be to introduce the race factor, as it may bring different dynamics (Welch, 1984). 
As a last note, apparently as parties would be interested in having more than the 30% 
female candidates established by quota, care should be taken when reinforcing legislation 
in that direction, for the following reasons: i) If a party in a given municipality is presenting 
                                                          
27 Having in mind that recruitment channels appear to be different for women (Davidson-Schmich ,2006). Having worked as a city 
council assessor may be a good predictor of nomination for the Brazilian case (Kuschnir, 1995, Lopez, 2004). Women on powerful 
associations are also likely to influence their nomination and election. Having a relative in a political office may also be a positive 
influence in nominations (Lopez, 2004; Bezerra, 1995).  
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a lower percentage of candidates due to a lower than average openness of the electorate, 
then increasing the candidates will probably not result in positive gains for women’s 
election; ii) If the reason for having a lower percentage is lack of qualified women, then 
presenting weaker candidates may result in a negative reaction in electoral terms. In the last 
case, legislation can work in the long term if it pushes parties to invest in recruitment and 
preparation of female militants, but there is the danger associated with a reduction in 
electorate demand due to the initial decrease in quality. Only when male interests are 
dominating the nomination decision would strong legislation on quota prove fruitful. 
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Appendix A, Data Sources 
 
A. Election characteristics: Collected from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) 
B. Municipality characteristics: 
GDP per capita; Average schooling for individuals above eighteen years, according to 
gender; Percentage of women in the municipality; Percentage of Catholics in the 
municipality; Percentage of Protestants in the municipality: Collected from Censos 
(Census). Since data is released every 10 years, we used the value of 2000 also for 2004 
elections. 
Population (used to transform variables in per capita terms): Collected from Censos for 
year 2000. For 2004, population censuses from 2007 were used to calculate constant 
population growth between 2000 and 2007, which were then used to estimate population in 
2004. 
Expenditure in Health; Expenditure in Education: Collected from Tesouro Nacional 
(FINBRA) 
Free vaccines; Infant mortality rate: Collected from DATASUS (Ministry of Health) 
Number of students per municipality; Number of teachers per municipality: Collected from 








Appendix B, Regression Results 
 
(1) Table B-1 , Linear regression from section V-A with party coefficients and standard 
errors 
Independent Variables Women Representation Percentage of Female Candidates Quota 
Student per teacher 0.0045 0.0778 0.0010 
 (0.0003) (0.0146) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita 0.0016 0.0648 0.0011 
 (0.0003) (0.0132) (0.0003) 
Average Schooling – male 0.0221 -0.638 -0.0033 
 (0.0217) (1.0355) (0.0192) 
Average Schooling – female -0.0159 0.774 0.0089 
 (0.0209) (0.9975) (0.0189) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.0167 0.5677 0.0070 
 (0.0015) (0.0741) (0.0014) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.0028 -0.0744 -0.0012 
 (0.0003) (0.0146) (0.0003) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.0001 -0.0299 -0.0006 
 (0.0005) (0.0241) (0.0005) 
District Magnitude 0.0091 -0.1267 -0.0056 
 (0.0005) (0.0226) (0.0005) 
Vaccine pc 0.0084 0.6385 0.0164 
 (0.0058) (0.2716) (0.0052) 
Infant Mortality pc -32.8333 -874.4 -15.2866 
 (6.9713) (324.8058) (5.8818) 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Year = 2004 -0.0042 2.7841 0.0818 
 (0.0040) (0.1873) (0.0036) 
Ideology – Left -0.2240 -5.3545 -0.0240 
 (0.0404) (2.3963) (0.0358) 
PC do B -0.1110 2.6190 0.0062 
 (0.0376) (2.2385) (0.0332) 
PCB omitted ommited ommited 
    
PCO -0.0651 3.1926 0.1574 
 (0.0779) (4.5721) (0.0764) 
PDT 0.3620 1.7002 -0.0374 
 (0.0364) (2.1346) (0.0320) 
PFL 0.2382 -2.6377 -0.0643 
 (0.0197) (1.1656) (0.0180) 
PGT -0.0608 -1.9928 0.0097 
 (0.0395) (2.2071) (0.0353) 
PHS 0.0519 -2.4893 -0.0300 
 (0.0236) (1.3702) (0.0215) 
PL 0.1493 -3.6224 -0.0682 
 (0.0200) 1.1815 0.0183 
PMDB 0.2604 -2.6396 -0.0728 
 (0.0196) 1.1625 0.0179 
PMN 0.3059 2.6516 0.0107 
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 (0.0379) 2.2050 0.0334 
PP 0.1716 -2.8768 -0.0588 
 (0.0199) 1.1754 0.0181 
PPS 0.3696 1.9865 -0.0272 
 (0.0365) 2.1357 0.0321 
PRN -0.0129 0.0777 0.0029 
 (0.0405) 2.3689 0.0352 
PRONA 0.0754 2.1854 0.0348 
 (0.0289) 1.7727 0.0276 
PRP 0.0623 -2.6070 -0.0378 
 (0.0225) 1.3088 0.0204 
PRTB 0.0183 -1.9437 -0.0076 
 (0.0243) 1.4238 0.0223 
PSB 0.3590 2.0274 -0.0359 
 (0.0366) 2.1413 0.0322 
PSC 0.0760 -3.2965 -0.0512 
 (0.0215) 1.2539 0.0195 
PSD 0.1623 -1.1750 -0.0211 
 (0.0232) 1.3028 0.0211 
PSDB 0.2298 -2.7179 -0.0611 
 (0.0197) 1.1665 0.0180 
PSDC 0.0873 -1.1450 -0.0340 
 (0.0231) 1.3592 0.0212 
PSL 0.0854 -1.4811 -0.0313 
 (0.0223) 1.3141 0.0203 
PST 0.0792 -1.3456 -0.0021 
 (0.0265) 1.4859 0.0242 
PSTU -0.1535 -1.9951 0.0815 
 (0.0417) 2.4279 0.0409 
PT 0.4204 2.9654 -0.0047 
 (0.0363) 2.1277 0.0319 
PT DO B 0.0754 -0.5740 -0.0076 
 (0.0240) 1.4222 0.0222 
PTB 0.1829 -2.6049 -0.0578 
 (0.0198) 1.1762 0.0181 
PTC 0.0745 -1.1137 -0.0133 
 (0.0271) 1.6123 0.0253 
PTN 0.0294 -1.4659 -0.0232 
 (0.0247) 1.4565 0.0226 
PV 0.3248 4.0956 0.0155 
 (0.0372) 2.1828 0.0329 
Region = Northeast -0.0499 -0.6020 0.0055 
 (0.0081) 0.3865 0.0075 
Region = North 0.0254 0.8173 0.0150 
.0  (0.0084) 0.4019 0.0078 
Region = Southeast 0.0302 -0.5505 -0.0128 
 (0.0069) 0.3253 0.0064 
Region = South -0.0196 -1.3066 -0.0250 
 (0.0080) 0.3778 0.0072, 3 
Constant  -0.3067 -1.4493 0.0226 
 (0.0798) 3.8869 0.0723 
Number of Observations 77692 77692 77692 
    






(2) Table B-2, Linear regression from section V-A without controlling for parties 
Independent Variables Women Representation Percentage of Female Candidates Quota 
Student per teacher 0.0037 0.0822 0.0012 
 (0.0003) (0.0146) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita 0.0014 0.0669 0.0011 
 (0.0003) (0.0132) (0.0003) 
Average Schooling – male 0.0114 -0.6007 -0.0010 
 (0.0219) (1.0359) (0.0192) 
Average Schooling – female -0.0010 0.6892 0.0053 
 (0.0210) (0.9978) (0.0183) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.0124 0.5969 0.0080 
 (0.0016) (0.0742) (0.0014) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.0019 -0.0804 -0.0015 
 (0.0003) (0.0146) (0.0003) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.0001 -0.0310 -0.0007 
 (0.0005) (0.0241) (0.0005) 
District Magnitude 0.0060 -0.1078 -0.0047 
 (0.0005) (0.0225) (0.0005) 
Vaccine pc 0.0045 0.6651 0.0174 
 (0.0058) (0.2716) (0.0052) 
Infant Mortality pc -25.5979 -880.0000 -16.4583 
 (7.0012) (324.5340) (5.8791) 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Year = 2004 -0.0253 2.8988 0.0864 
 (0.0040) (0.1850) (0.0035) 
Ideology – Left -0.0408 -0.4678 -0.0098 
 (0.0036) (0.1732) (0.0033) 
Region = Northeast -0.0628 -0.5232 0.0081 
 (0.0082) (0.3852) (0.0075) 
Region = North 0.0137 0.8664 0.0172 
.0  (0.0085) (0.4018) (0.0078) 
Region = Southeast 0.0222 -0.4799 -0.0107 
 (0.0070) (0.3246) (0.0064) 
Region = South -0.0199 -1.3350 -0.0257 
 (0.0081) (0.3760) (0.0073) 
Constant  0.0654 -5.2107 -0.0782 
 (0.0779) (3.7202) (0.0699) 
Number of Observations 77692 77692 77692 
    









(3) Table B-3, Linear regression from section V-A with the number, not percentage, of 
female candidates as dependent variable 
Independent Variables Number of female candidates 
Student per teacher 0.0187 
 (0.0011) 
GDP per capita 0.0101 
 (0.0011) 
Average Schooling – male 0.1656 
 (0.0601) 
Average Schooling – female -0.1868 
 (0.0563) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.0934 
 (0.0052) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.0153 
 (0.0001) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.0039 
 (0.0016) 
District Magnitude 0.1427 
 (0.0046) 
Vaccine pc 0.0547 
 (0.0178) 
Infant Mortality pc -150.0000 
 (18.5599) 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0000 
 (0.000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
Year = 2004 0.2144 
 (0.0167) 
Ideology – Left -1.0996 
 (0.1384) 






























































Region = Northeast -0.2383 
 (0.0261) 
Region = North 0.0916 
 (0.0263) 
Region = Southeast 0.2243 
 (0.0230) 
Region = South 0.0153 
 (0.0258) 
Constant  -4.7134 
 (0.2519) 
Number of Observations 77692 
  








(4) Table B-4, Model from section V-A with logit specification 
Independent Variables Percentage of female candidates 
Student per teacher 0.0206 
 (0.0015) 
GDP per capita 0.0088 
 (0.0019) 
Average Schooling – male 0.0778 
 (0.0990) 
Average Schooling – female -0.0623 
 (0.0941) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.0710 
 (0.0071) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.0131 
 (0.0015) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.0007 
 (0.0025) 
District Magnitude 0.0574 
 (0.0035) 
Vaccine pc 0.0404 
 (0.0266) 
Infant Mortality pc -150.0000 
 (31.1416) 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
Year = 2004 0.0128 
 (0.0194) 
Ideology – Left 0.4533 
 (0.0939) 






























































Region = Northeast -0.2192 
 (0.0378) 
Region = North 0.1149 
 (0.0393) 
Region = Southeast 0.1573 
 (0.0329) 
Region = South -0.0784 
 (0.0369) 
Constant  -3.6059 
 (0.3647) 
Number of Observations 77692 
  









(5) Table B-5, Model from section V-A with probit specification (coefficients 
correspond to marginal effects, df/dx) 
Independent Variables Percentage of female candidates 
Student per teacher 0.0126 
 (0.0009) 
GDP per capita 0.0050 
 (0.0010) 
Average Schooling – male 0.0501 
 (0.0601) 
Average Schooling – female -0.0384 
 (0.0573) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.0449 
 (0.0044) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.0081 
 (0.0009) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.0007 
 (0.0015) 
District Magnitude 0.0333 
 (0.0020) 
Vaccine pc 0.0262 
 (0.0162) 
Infant Mortality pc -91.0769 
 (19.0006) 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0000 
 (0.0000) 
Year = 2004 0.0057 
 (0.0118) 
Ideology – Left -0.6203 
 (0.1121) 






























































Region = Northeast -0.1385 
 (0.0230) 
Region = North 0.0710 
 (0.0239) 
Region = Southeast 0.0927 
 (0.0199) 
Region = South -0.0489 
 (0.0225) 
Constant  -2.2584 
 (0.2224) 
Number of Observations 77692 
  









(6) Table B-6, regressions from section V-B, presented on Table 4, with coefficients of 
party dummies 
 
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success  
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004  
Percentage of female candidates 0.4690 0.3689 0.5219 0.4450 0.2674 0.216  
 (0.0252) (0.0228) (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0067) (0.0054)  
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0104 -0.0084 -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0028  
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  
Student per teacher -0.1733 -0.3317 -0.0481 -0.0468 -0.1160 -0.124  
 (0.0408) (0.0447) (0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0109) (0.0106)  
GDP per capita -0.1141 -0.1430 -0.0450 -0.0058 -0.0221 -0.0214  
 (0.0348) (0.0365) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0093) (0.0087)  
Average Schooling – male 3.3878 -0.4805 0.0200 -2.9894 -0.3152 -1.5012  
 (2.7494) (2.9137) (1.2453) (1.3428) (0.7316) (0.6925)  
Average Schooling – female 0.1202 1.2570 0.0751 3.0424 1.1072 1.6847  
 (2.6328) (2.7622) (1.1925) (1.2730) (0.7006) (0.6565)  
Percentage of Women in Municipality -0.9667 -1.4002 -0.2514 -0.6232 -0.3499 -0.428  
 (0.2133) (0.1994) (0.0966) (0.0919) (0.0568) (0.0474)  
Percentage of Catholics in 
Municipality  
0.2326 0.1562 0.0436 0.0599 0.0971 0.0726  
 (0.0403) (0.0405) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0107) (0.0096)  
Percentage of Protestants in 
Municipality 
0.1017 -0.0139 -0.0414 -0.0366 0.0300 0.0021  
 (0.0676) (0.0666) (0.0306) (0.0307) (0.0180) (0.0158)  
District Magnitude 0.4732 0.6669 -0.0395 0.1072 -0.3134 -0.0983  
 (0.0688) (0.0897) (0.0312) (0.0413) (0.0183) (0.0213)  
Vaccine pc -0.4489 -1.9100 0.0434 -0.8141 -0.6470 -0.9414  
 (0.6554) (1.0566) (0.2969) (0.4870) (0.1744) (0.2511)  
Infant Mortality pc 2600.000 2900.000 49.2730 1400.0000 1300.0000 1300.0000  
 (836.359) (992.258) (378.8232) (457.2922) (222.5654) (235.8302)  
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0008 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0003 0.0000  
 (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)  
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000  
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000)  
Ideology – Left 14.5535 13.2106 1.2459 1.1219 1.1519 1.7218  
 (3.2777) (2.3442) (1.4846) (1.0804) (0.8722) (0.5572)  
PC do B -5.3667 -11.1738 2.0809 -0.5920 -0.2635 -1.5663  
 (2.3124) (1.7947) (1.0474) (0.8271) (0.6154) (0.4265)  
PCB -21.5916 -20.2998 1.9596 -1.1054 1.5453 -1.8840  
 (5.7241) (3.9773) (2.5927) (1.833) (1.5233) (0.9453)  
PCO -10.3731 -10.1236 -0.7455 -1.7322 3.1769 0.5566  
 (11.8583) (8.3412) (5.3711) (3.8441) (3.1556) (1.9825)  
PDT 28.4078 16.9601 3.4823 2.8334 5.5444 3.8071  
 (1.8768) (1.4698) (0.8501) (0.6774) (0.4994) (0.3493)  
PFL 56.6181 42.8726 7.4228 5.8977 13.2307 10.9064  
 (2.9365) (2.1904) (1.3301) (1.0095) (0.7814) (0.5206)  
PGT -1.4368 omitted 1.1737 omitted 0.5806 omitted  
 (4.1640)  (1.8860)  (1.1081)   
PHS 8.7065 5.3019 1.1665 2.0611 0.6902 0.9305  
 (3.6137) (2.5567) (1.6368) (1.1783) (0.9617) (0.6077)  
PL 40.9258 35.3728 5.3294 4.035 6.2083 6.5720  
 (2.9929) (2.2068) (1.3556) (1.0170) (0.7964) (0.5245)  
PMDB 58.6177 43.7796 7.1708 6.6845 14.1449 11.5933  
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 (2.9326) (2.1830) (1.3283) (1.0061) (0.7804) (0.5188)  
PMN 9.2394 -1.5685 1.1293 1.2302 1.1709 -0.0462  
 (2.4336) (1.8803) (1.1023) (0.8665) (0.6476) (0.4469)  
PP 49.9997 38.6682 6.5833 6.0401 9.8376 8.8087  
 (2.9501) (2.2014) (1.3362) (1.0146) (0.7851) (0.5232)  
PPS 21.5746 16.0050 2.7862 2.1223 3.425 3.2881  
 (1.8971) (1.4806) (0.8593) (0.6823) (0.5048) (0.3519)  
PRN 10.5448 omitted 1.7129 omitted 0.9737 omitted  
 (4.1701)  (1.8888)  (1.1097)   
PRONA 4.8261 10.0449 1.7797 0.5082 1.3663 1.3162  
 (4.6670) (3.1152) (2.1139) (1.4357) (1.2420) (0.7404)  
PRP 19.2741 16.8046 2.4545 2.8103 1.4453 2.9306  
 (3.3338) (2.4760) (1.5100) (1.1411) (0.8872) (0.5885)  
PRTB 12.4200 4.5800 2.1923 1.9355 1.1757 1.0173  
 (3.5899) (2.6677) (1.6260) (1.2294) (0.9553) (0.6340)  
PSB 18.2378 8.0324 3.0171 2.4185 2.5586 2.0595  
 (1.9426) (1.5256) (0.8799) (0.7031) (0.5169) (0.3626)  
PSC 23.9751 14.4710 2.1048 1.7577 2.0818 2.1807  
 (3.1453) (2.3971) (1.4246) (1.1047) (0.8370) (0.5697)  
PSD 34.7638 omitted 4.6374 omitted 5.1369 omitted  
 (3.1033)  (1.4056)  (0.8258)   
PSDB 55.9161 43.8136 7.5439 6.7710 12.5138 11.2391  
 (2.9401) (2.1944) (1.3317) (1.0113) (0.7824) (0.5215)  
PSDC 19.4555 9.2250 1.1293 2.0997 1.5232 1.3538  
 (3.4586) (2.5490) (1.5666) (1.1747) (0.9204) (0.6058)  
PSL 25.0190 13.2403 1.6237 1.3103 2.4971 1.9169  
 (3.2791) (2.4715) (1.4852) (1.1390) (0.8726) (0.5874)  
PST 22.6570 omitted 3.4818 omitted 2.2172 omitted  
 (3.3054)  (1.4971)  (0.8796)   
PSTU -6.5509 -12.8698 0.4439 -0.4028 1.5078 -0.0994  
 (5.4432) (5.1469) (2.4655) (2.3720) (1.4485) (1.2233)  
PT 9.3647 6.5975 2.3146 2.3978 0.1844 1.3725  
 (1.8500) (1.4029) (0.8380) (0.6465) (0.4923) (0.3334)  
PT DO B 14.7978 10.6710 2.4266 2.1375 1.1086 2.0224  
 (3.5498) (2.6692) (1.6079) (1.2301) (0.9447) (0.6344)  
PTB 48.1919 36.0196 6.1266 4.8620 7.8991 6.8716  
 (2.9559) (2.2027) (1.3389) (1.0151) (0.7866) (0.5235)  
PTC omitted 8.6473 omitted 2.0328 omitted 1.5279  
  (2.6782)  (1.2343)  (0.6365)  
PTN 8.0566 5.9181 1.4997 -0.4513 0.8939 0.5485  
 (3.8170) (2.6481) (1.7289) (1.2204) (1.0157) (0.6294)  
PV omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted  
        
Region = Northeast 2.9076 2.6619 0.9200 1.0562 1.4464 0.9157  
 (1.1169) (1.0597) (0.5059) (0.4884) (0.2972) (0.2519)  
Region = North -1.3646 -0.3504 0.1656 0.2799 -0.6891 -0.4839  
 (1.1659) (1.0874) (0.5281) (0.5011) (0.3103) (0.2584)  
Region = Southeast 0.7545 -0.5195 -1.0897 -1.5433 -0.8327 -0.6525  
 (0.9484) (0.9409) (0.4296) (0.4336) (0.2524) (0.2236)  
Region = South 1.7750 2.8733 -0.8205 -0.3837 0.3772 0.7949  
 (1.1221) (1.0244) (0.5082) (0.4721) (0.2986) (0.2435)  
Constant  29.3345 72.9934 6.0576 22.0794 15.6791 20.2707  
 (11.0052) (10.1977) (4.9847) (4.6997) (2.9286) (2.4237)  
Number of Observations 37798 39894 37798 39894 37798 39894  
        
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1832 0.1555 0.0913 0.0899 0.2529 0.2007  
           





(7) Table B-7, regressions from section V-B, presented on Table 4, without party 
dummies 
 
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.6735 0.5429 0.5443 0.4706 0.3184 0.2606 
 (0.0261) (0.0233) (0.0113) (0.0104) (0.0070) (0.0056) 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0133 -0.0106 -0.0041 -0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0034 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Student per teacher -0.2832 -0.5246 -0.0622 -0.0746 -0.1473 -0.1729 
 (0.0427) (0.0463) (0.0185) (0.0206) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
GDP per capita -0.154 -0.176 -0.0498 -0.0103 -0.0305 -0.0290 
 (0.0365) (0.0379) (0.0158) (0.0169) (0.0098) (0.0091) 
Average Schooling – male 2.6577 -3.9427 -0.1016 -3.4486 -0.6296 -2.3129 
 (2.8850) (3.0255) (1.2495) (1.3469) (0.7722) (0.7253) 
Average Schooling – female 2.3644 4.9198 0.3881 3.5303 1.815 2.5442 
 (2.7626) (2.8682) (1.1965) (1.2769) (0.7395) (0.6876) 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -1.7826 -2.155 -0.351 -0.7228 -0.5484 -0.6051 
 (0.2233) (0.2064) (0.0967) (0.0919) (0.0598) (0.0495) 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.4405 0.3039 0.0684 0.081 0.1481 0.1108 
 (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0113) (0.0101) 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.1823 0.0016 -0.0333 -0.0331 0.0479 0.0077 
 (0.0709) (0.0692) (0.0307) (0.0308) (0.0190) (0.0166) 
District Magnitude -0.1834 0.1901 -0.1157 0.0439 -0.4611 -0.2029 
 (0.0709) (0.0921) (0.0307) (0.041) (0.0190) (0.0221) 
Vaccine pc -0.9812 -3.2673 -0.0291 -1.0108 -0.8285 -1.2926 
 (0.6876) (1.0971) (0.2978) (0.4884) (0.1840) (0.2630) 
Infant Mortality pc 3500.000 4400.000 149.276 1600.000 1600.00 1700.00 
 (877.0775) (1000.000) (379.871) (458.637) (234.764) (246.9539) 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
 (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Ideology – Left -13.5071 -9.9035 -1.813 -1.478 -5.1682 -3.4747 
 (0.5110) (0.4835) (0.2213) (0.2152) (0.1368) (0.1159) 
Region = Northeast 2.2570 -0.3068 0.8253 0.6535 1.2265 0.2128 
 (1.1703) (1.0978) (0.5069) (0.4888) (0.3133) (0.2632) 
Region = North -2.6635 -2.6551 0.0261 -0.0532 -1.0737 -1.0567 
 (1.2223) (1.1271) (0.5294) (0.5018) (0.3272) (0.2702) 
Region = Southeast -0.5309 -2.3845 -1.2627 -1.8213 -1.1998 -1.1139 
 (0.9933) (0.9758) (0.4302) (0.4344) (0.2659) (0.2339) 
Region = South 1.8542 3.176 -0.8429 -0.3341 0.3273 0.8511 
 (1.1727) (1.0619) (0.5079) (0.4727) (0.3139) (0.2546) 
Constant  102.7979 138.3284 15.367 31.02 31.5223 35.0786 
 (11.128) (10.3046) (4.8198) (4.5875) (2.9787) (2.4702) 
Number of Observations 37798 39894 37798 39894 37798 39894 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0994 0.0880 0.0839 0.0829 0.1666 0.1219 
       









Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.4331 0.3781 0.5398 0.4768 0.2699 0.2233 
 0.0886 0.0761 0.0419 0.0369 0.0229 0.0180 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0100 -0.0087 -0.0045 -0.0033 -0.0037 -0.0030 
 0.0011 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 
Student per teacher -0.2377 -0.1655 -0.0298 -0.0341 -0.0244 -0.0274 
 0.1438 0.1396 0.0680 0.0676 0.0372 0.0331 
GDP per capita -0.1111 0.0004 0.0392 0.2253 -0.0996 0.0112 
 0.2695 0.2323 0.1274 0.1125 0.0696 0.0551 
Average Schooling – male 8.2251 18.0465 -2.5098 3.0534 -0.6037 1.3194 
 9.9548 9.6377 4.7070 4.6690 2.5722 2.2855 
Average Schooling – female -7.3091 -15.5084 0.6328 -1.8023 2.0339 -0.4553 
 9.3694 8.8709 4.4302 4.2976 2.4210 2.1037 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -1.2477 -0.9959 0.3556 -0.4401 -0.4163 -0.4016 
 0.7324 0.6249 0.3463 0.3027 0.1893 0.1482 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.0648 0.1868 0.1112 -0.0114 0.0535 0.0247 
 0.1703 0.1569 0.0805 0.0760 0.0440 0.0372 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.0131 -0.0205 0.0922 -0.0576 0.0632 0.0045 
 0.2679 0.2516 0.1267 0.1219 0.0692 0.0597 
District Magnitude 1.0430 1.0046 0.0396 0.0210 -0.2957 -0.1372 
 0.2963 0.3192 0.1401 0.1546 0.0766 0.0757 
Vaccine pc -2.9379 -0.848 2.8182 -0.8931 0.1935 -1.6639 
 2.3547 2.9557 1.1134 1.4319 0.6084 0.7009 
Infant Mortality pc 839.8146 2100.00 -700.00 670.1299 675.1471 1400.00 
 3800.00 3700.00 1800.00 1800.00 983.1126 875.7559 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0188 0.0061 0.0083 -0.0009 0.0062 0.0014 
 0.0105 0.0019 0.0049 0.0009 0.0027 0.0004 
Expenditure in Health per capita -0.0134 -0.0037 -0.0053 0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0008 
 0.0137 0.0013 0.0065 0.0006 0.0036 0.0003 
Ideology – Left 13.695 15.2854 2.9937 0.7053 1.9115 1.3836 
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10.7361 6.3068 5.2011 3.4465 2.546 
Constant  57.2911 30.7393 -34.320 16.1712 15.7113 18.7078 
 40.3636 35.0085 19.0853 16.9600 10.4295 8.302 
Number of Observations 3066 3635 3066 3635 3066 3635 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1981 0.1854 0.0939 0.0891 0.3055 0.2047 
       
       
       
       









Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.2865 0.3860 0.6160 0.4850 0.2808 0.2379 
 0.0411 0.0339 0.0194 0.0165 0.0122 0.0085 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0041 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0031 
 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Student per teacher 0.0195 -0.2452 -0.1385 -0.0330 -0.0726 -0.0939 
 0.0866 0.0791 0.0409 0.0385 0.0257 0.0198 
GDP per capita -0.0970 -0.1392 0.0077 0.0371 -0.0132 -0.0164 
 0.0586 0.0519 0.0277 0.0252 0.0174 0.0130 
Average Schooling – male -1.4178 -2.5247 -0.0199 -6.8089 2.1483 -1.9167 
 5.8768 5.1344 2.7732 2.4988 1.7463 1.2843 
Average Schooling – female 2.6063 3.0938 -0.5643 6.4920 -1.0603 2.2221 
 5.5267 4.8444 2.608 2.3576 1.6423 1.2118 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -0.7133 -1.2470 -0.0888 -0.6590 -0.1817 -0.3799 
 0.3823 0.3221 0.1804 0.1567 0.1136 0.0806 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.1371 0.0795 0.0194 0.0787 0.0646 0.0310 
 0.0691 0.0622 0.0326 0.0303 0.0205 0.0156 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.3485 -0.4481 -0.1329 -0.0815 -0.2192 -0.1942 
 0.1472 0.1264 0.0695 0.0615 0.0438 0.0316 
District Magnitude 0.6093 0.8878 -0.1419 0.0907 -0.3837 -0.1685 
 0.1267 0.2027 0.0598 0.0986 0.0376 0.0507 
Vaccine pc -1.1400 -1.7472 -0.2030 -0.9496 -0.9007 -0.6893 
 1.1103 1.8080 0.5240 0.8799 0.3299 0.4523 
Infant Mortality pc 2700.00 2400.00 646.1659 1000.00 1600.00 981.254 
 1200.00 1500.00 555.2504 750.2502 349.6453 385.6125 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0006 0.0010 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 
 0.0019 0.0005 0.0009 0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 
 0.0016 0.0005 0.0008 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 
Ideology – Left 1.6151 13.743 2.1702 1.4352 0.6109 2.0908 
 5.8750 3.2879 2.7723 1.6001 1.7458 0.8224 
Constant  41.5220 75.6646 2.9459 22.6194 12.8759 23.0938 
 19.2233 16.0929 9.0713 7.8319 5.7122 4.0254 
Number of Observations 12943 16994 12943 16994 12943 16994 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1828 0.1560 0.1344 0.1134 0.2530 0.2148 
       
       
       
       









Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.4413 0.1618 0.5635 0.4907 0.2467 0.1537 
 0.0810 0.0659 0.0400 0.0322 0.0194 0.0140 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0090 -0.0062 -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0022 
 0.0010 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
Student per teacher 0.0510 -0.3520 -0.0213 -0.0723 -0.0225 -0.0488 
 0.1400 0.1101 0.0690 0.0538 0.0335 0.0234 
GDP per capita -0.1241 -0.4489 -0.1738 -0.2373 -0.1268 -0.1516 
 0.3631 0.3782 0.1791 0.1850 0.0868 0.0803 
Average Schooling – male 5.3300 4.3511 1.4243 0.9486 0.6171 -2.4314 
 10.2841 8.7807 5.0718 4.2948 2.4593 1.8643 
Average Schooling – female -2.7801 -4.0862 -1.3051 -1.4786 0.2890 2.7051 
 9.6399 8.2688 4.7540 4.0444 2.3053 1.7556 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -0.9131 -1.1504 -0.3198 -0.3009 -0.3107 -0.327 
 0.6406 0.5106 0.3159 0.2498 0.1532 0.1084 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  -0.1812 -0.0301 -0.0540 -0.0620 0.0236 0.0197 
 0.1291 0.1113 0.0637 0.0544 0.0309 0.0236 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.4078 -0.0184 -0.2104 -0.1798 -0.0999 -0.0276 
 0.1978 0.1698 0.0976 0.0831 0.0473 0.0361 
District Magnitude 0.7072 1.3794 0.0453 0.3116 -0.2597 -0.0628 
 0.2788 0.3263 0.1375 0.1596 0.0667 0.0693 
Vaccine pc -0.0560 -1.8525 -0.1771 -0.0507 0.2013 0.052 
 1.3759 1.9647 0.6786 0.961 0.3290 0.4171 
Infant Mortality pc 165.1947 1700.00 -280.00 762.0604 615.1734 521.8483 
 2000.00 1700.00 1000.00 823.7697 489.3497 357.5809 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0126 0.0014 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0015 0.0012 
 0.0060 0.0022 0.0030 0.0011 0.0014 0.0005 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0362 -0.0011 -0.0054 -0.0012 0.0048 -0.0010 
 0.0172 0.0018 0.0085 0.0009 0.0041 0.0004 
Ideology – Left 2.1966 13.0238 1.7867 1.2833 -0.0331 1.8666 
 12.7900 6.9671 6.3076 3.4077 3.0586 1.4792 
Constant  60.5535 71.7456 17.5862 18.3100 17.7392 17.2309 
 31.8668 25.1130 15.7155 12.2832 7.6205 5.3319 
Number of Observations 3734 4844 3734 4844 3734 4844 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1850 0.1533 0.0913 0.0907 0.2610 0.1853 
       
       
       
       









Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.5783 0.3686 0.4226 0.300 0.2071 0.1491 
 0.0448 0.0505 0.0191 0.0204 0.0103 0.0105 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0110 -0.0071 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0029 -0.0020 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Student per teacher -0.2953 -0.3735 -0.0483 -0.0207 -0.0919 -0.0980 
 0.0703 0.0939 0.0300 0.0379 0.0161 0.0194 
GDP per capita -0.1365 -0.0865 -0.0751 -0.0136 -0.0339 -0.0176 
 0.0488 0.0652 0.0208 0.0263 0.0112 0.0135 
Average Schooling – male 4.4288 -8.4243 -0.6932 -2.3901 -0.0065 -0.5773 
 4.3447 5.9966 1.8537 2.4188 0.9943 1.2414 
Average Schooling – female 1.9726 7.0076 1.4703 2.5694 0.7712 0.6211 
 4.2210 5.8052 1.8009 2.3416 0.9660 1.2018 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -1.3233 -0.4317 -0.4278 -0.8903 -0.7394 -0.5049 
 0.3989 0.4988 0.1702 0.2012 0.0913 0.1033 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.3202 0.2082 0.0778 0.0270 0.0519 0.0463 
 0.0764 0.0998 0.0326 0.0403 0.0175 0.0207 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.3481 0.1330 0.0347 -0.0365 0.0062 -0.0019 
 0.1287 0.1558 0.0549 0.0629 0.0295 0.0323 
District Magnitude 0.6147 0.6667 0.0751 0.1536 -0.1911 -0.0219 
 0.1098 0.1279 0.0469 0.0516 0.0251 0.0265 
Vaccine pc 1.4751 -2.2800 0.1318 -1.0329 0.6499 -0.4897 
 1.2640 2.7892 0.5393 1.125 0.2893 0.5774 
Infant Mortality pc 4600.00 5800.00 -1200.00 1900.00 966.1986 2700.00 
 2000.00 3700.00 859.2403 1500.00 460.9059 762.8388 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 
 0.0013 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0004 0.0011 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 0.0013 0.0005 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 
Ideology – Left 23.8974 14.9433 0.6197 0.6919 1.6898 1.5595 
 4.6164 4.6807 1.9696 1.888 1.0565 0.969 
Constant  21.3391 23.3100 10.8083 38.5917 35.6901 25.2856 
 21.8991 28.3957 9.3435 11.4536 5.012 5.8784 
Number of Observations 12957 8792 12957 8792 12957 8792 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2130 0.1878 0.0624 0.0521 0.2753 0.2347 
       
       
       
       









Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.6120 0.2282 0.4730 0.4591 0.3422 0.2140 
 0.0700 0.0620 0.0306 0.0273 0.0197 0.0153 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0119 -0.0068 -0.0032 -0.0033 -0.0045 -0.0028 
 0.0009 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
Student per teacher -0.1762 -0.0724 -0.0046 0.0418 -0.2064 -0.2010 
 0.1179 0.1263 0.0516 0.0556 0.0332 0.0312 
GDP per capita -0.1229 -0.2165 -0.0381 -0.0726 -0.0284 -0.0163 
 0.1042 0.0937 0.0456 0.0413 0.0294 0.0231 
Average Schooling – male 3.4114 -4.0112 3.9166 3.4537 2.2101 1.4347 
 6.5620 6.8798 2.8710 3.0290 1.8480 1.6968 
Average Schooling – female 2.2825 5.0876 -1.3350 1.0671 0.6227 0.2789 
 5.8259 5.9723 2.5489 2.6295 1.6407 1.4729 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -0.0205 -1.8669 -0.1335 -0.7055 -0.6335 -0.6665 
 0.6655 0.5934 0.2912 0.2613 0.1874 0.1463 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.2860 0.2702 -0.0029 0.0490 0.1329 0.1244 
 0.1356 0.1258 0.0593 0.0554 0.0382 0.0310 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.2385 0.2210 -0.0382 -0.0064 0.1377 0.1280 
 0.1596 0.1529 0.0698 0.0673 0.0449 0.0377 
District Magnitude 0.4139 0.5766 -0.0341 0.0007 -0.2742 -0.0867 
 0.1896 0.2823 0.0829 0.1243 0.0534 0.0696 
Vaccine pc 4.3198 1.0292 0.5344 -0.2794 -2.6270 -1.3933 
 3.8330 3.7757 1.6770 1.6623 1.0794 0.9312 
Infant Mortality pc 2900.00 1400.00 1900.00 6000.00 1800.00 2400.00 
 3200.00 3700.00 1400.00 1600.00 911.9417 919.8215 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0028 0.0029 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0005 
 0.002 0.0011 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0009 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 
 0.0011 0.0014 0.0005 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004 
Ideology – Left 16.0258 10.2469 0.1768 0.3914 0.6543 0.1126 
 12.6201 8.1067 5.5216 3.5692 3.5540 1.9993 
Constant  -45.5575 69.0452 -7.5815 12.5641 22.1119 23.3311 
 35.7966 33.3827 15.6618 14.6977 10.0809 8.2332 
Number of Observations 5098 5629 5098 5629 5098 5629 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1907 0.1891 0.0814 0.0921 0.2843 0.2909 
       
       
       
       








(13) Table B-13, Regressions from table 3, section V-D, Ideology 1 (Centre) 
 
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.4234 0.4088 0.6945 0.6334 0.4075 0.3622 
 0.045 0.0489 0.0232 0.0254 0.0151 0.0144 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0123 -0.0113 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0058 -0.0049 
 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
Student per teacher -0.1405 -0.3597 -0.0640 -0.0956 -0.1757 -0.1857 
 0.0696 0.0913 0.0358 0.0474 0.0233 0.0270 
GDP per capita -0.0011 -0.0886 -0.0669 -0.0507 -0.0043 -0.0251 
 0.064 0.0807 0.0330 0.0419 0.0214 0.0239 
Average Schooling – male 0.0492 3.8468 1.4987 -4.5932 0.1896 -0.2698 
 4.3318 5.602 2.2316 2.9061 1.4513 1.6563 
Average Schooling – female 2.4972 -3.8179 -1.2813 4.0513 1.0887 0.1777 
 4.103 5.2727 2.1137 2.7352 1.3747 1.5589 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.2041 0.1956 -0.1653 -0.4457 -0.1437 -0.1803 
 0.3553 0.4065 0.1830 0.2109 0.1190 0.1202 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.2987 0.4377 0.0719 0.0596 0.2028 0.2168 
 0.0686 0.0838 0.0353 0.0434 0.0230 0.0248 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.2107 0.3077 -0.0175 -0.0579 0.1394 0.1350 
 0.1105 0.1335 0.0569 0.0692 0.0370 0.0395 
District Magnitude 0.5291 0.8171 -0.1802 -0.1592 -0.5736 -0.3099 
 0.1327 0.2444 0.0684 0.1268 0.0445 0.0723 
Vaccine pc -1.5467 -3.0371 0.3202 -2.0672 -1.5344 -2.5334 
 1.0947 2.2188 0.5639 1.1510 0.3668 0.6560 
Infant Mortality pc 4100.00 3500.00 106.6732 2200.00 2700.00 2600.00 
 1400.00 1900.00 701.9948 987.433 456.5547 562.7844 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0024 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 
 0.0011 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 
 0.0009 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 
Region = Northeast -5.0702 -4.3265 0.3537 -0.1717 -0.3587 -0.4652 
 1.8745 2.1615 0.9657 1.1213 0.6281 0.6391 
Region = North -1.9788 -2.894 -0.1460 0.3456 -2.0805 -1.808 
 1.9295 2.2004 0.9940 1.1415 0.6465 0.6506 
Region = Southeast -3.2364 -4.2101 -1.7190 -2.4764 -3.1374 -1.9063 
 1.5692 1.8984 0.8084 0.9848 0.5258 0.5613 
Region = South -1.061 2.6799 -1.7824 -0.0101 -0.9875 1.9163 
 1.8365 1.9985 0.9461 1.0367 0.6153 0.5909 
Constant  -5.4266 19.3674 2.6536 23.5271 3.3297 10.7963 
 17.7198 20.4278 9.1286 10.597 5.9369 6.0397 
Number of Observations 11437 9139 11437 9139 11437 9139 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1177 0.1024 0.1145 0.1181 0.1704 0.1346 
       






(14) Table B-14, Regressions from table 3, section V-D, Ideology 2 
(Undifferentiated) 
 
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.5060 0.2972 0.2107 0.2620 0.1032 0.0942 
 0.0691 0.0468 0.0237 0.0202 0.0107 0.0080 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0082 -0.0056 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0012 
 0.0008 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Student per teacher -0.2066 -0.3170 -0.0200 -0.0267 -0.0522 -0.069 
 0.1205 0.0992 0.0413 0.0429 0.0187 0.0170 
GDP per capita -0.2032 -0.2376 -0.0270 0.0187 -0.0217 -0.0344 
 0.0979 0.0658 0.0335 0.0285 0.0152 0.0113 
Average Schooling – male 13.1041 -10.811 -2.4485 -4.1692 0.0016 -1.4963 
 10.2077 7.3510 3.4950 3.1788 1.5810 1.2584 
Average Schooling – female -13.2372 9.8546 2.8984 3.5433 -0.3586 1.4549 
 9.9782 7.0648 3.4164 3.0551 1.5455 1.2094 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -2.4735 -1.7935 -0.5457 -0.6663 -0.3768 -0.4381 
 0.6939 0.4621 0.2376 0.1998 0.1075 0.0791 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.1505 0.0723 -0.0437 0.0386 0.0117 -0.0058 
 0.1228 0.0892 0.0420 0.0386 0.0190 0.0153 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality -0.3527 -0.1780 -0.1976 -0.0879 -0.0984 -0.0991 
 0.2252 0.1573 0.0771 0.0680 0.0349 0.0269 
District Magnitude 0.2374 0.4655 -0.0162 0.0488 -0.0775 -0.0265 
 0.1571 0.1381 0.0538 0.0597 0.0243 0.0236 
Vaccine pc -0.6215 -2.4513 1.0609 0.5723 -0.1481 -0.1787 
 2.0739 2.2346 0.7101 0.9663 0.3212 0.3825 
Infant Mortality pc 1700.00 -1400.0 296.438 -1100.0 1200.00 -300.00 
 2600.00 2300.00 895.5429 1000.00 405.1264 399.862 
Expenditure in Education per capita 0.0004 0.0060 0.0009 0.0013 0.0007 0.001 
 0.0028 0.0015 0.001 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0006 
 0.0029 0.0010 0.001 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 
Region = Northeast 7.6737 12.827 2.9869 1.3414 1.0331 2.0401 
 3.5728 2.4025 1.2233 1.0389 0.5534 0.4113 
Region = North -4.3641 4.9478 2.0336 -1.0948 -0.8778 0.3352 
 3.9123 2.5852 1.3395 1.1179 0.6060 0.4425 
Region = Southeast -2.4359 2.6864 1.5674 -0.9691 -0.1081 0.0874 
 3.2225 2.2030 1.1033 0.9526 0.4991 0.3771 
Region = South 4.6118 9.7477 2.7426 -0.3931 0.9998 1.2370 
 3.7612 2.5606 1.2878 1.1073 0.5826 0.4383 
Constant  130.5889 97.2734 27.9107 29.871 22.7512 25.7618 
 34.9433 23.0597 11.9641 9.9718 5.4123 3.9475 
Number of Observations 3740 6785 3740 6785 3740 6785 
       





(15) Table B-15, Regressions from table 3, section V-D, Ideology 3 (Left) 
 
       
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
   2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.5435 0.4070 0.4066 0.3711 0.1995 0.1737 
 0.0479 0.0398 0.0196 0.0171 0.0098 0.0081 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0099 -0.0081 -0.0030 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0023 
 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
Student per teacher -0.2130 -0.3481 -0.0557 -0.0344 -0.0895 -0.1003 
 0.0791 0.0781 0.0324 0.0337 0.0162 0.0159 
GDP per capita -0.0414 -0.1100 -0.0431 0.0060 -0.0083 0.0017 
 0.0623 0.0623 0.0255 0.0269 0.0128 0.0127 
Average Schooling – male -0.7935 -0.4603 2.2862 -2.6969 -1.0873 -0.6617 
 5.6248 5.1453 2.3025 2.2186 1.1522 1.0477 
Average Schooling – female 4.4524 1.3231 -1.2615 2.4480 1.3921 0.8318 
 5.4193 4.8780 2.2184 2.1034 1.1101 0.9933 
Percentage of Women in Municipality -0.8442 -1.9207 -0.2849 -0.5860 -0.2316 -0.4656 
 0.4217 0.3462 0.1726 0.1493 0.0864 0.0705 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.2493 0.1258 0.0335 0.1289 0.0378 0.0427 
 0.0792 0.0701 0.0324 0.0302 0.0162 0.0143 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.1806 -0.0107 0.0057 0.0879 0.0162 0.0107 
 0.1301 0.1142 0.0532 0.0492 0.0266 0.0232 
District Magnitude 0.6415 1.2259 0.1068 0.4092 -0.1877 0.0093 
 0.1324 0.1640 0.0542 0.0707 0.0271 0.0334 
Vaccine pc -2.2363 -2.6509 0.1322 -0.8836 -0.3640 -0.6246 
 1.3330 1.8544 0.5457 0.7996 0.2731 0.3776 
Infant Mortality pc 5400.00 6700.00 19.8376 1300 1100.00 1700.00 
 1700.00 1900.00 700.7328 835.6467 350.6635 394.614 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
 0.0014 0.0004 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 0.0012 0.0004 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Region = Northeast 1.3819 0.1424 0.6094 0.2257 0.5232 0.0056 
 2.2072 1.8567 0.9035 0.8006 0.4521 0.3781 
Region = North -0.6849 -1.5347 -0.3384 -0.132 -0.4257 -0.5922 
 2.2638 1.8964 0.9267 0.8177 0.4637 0.3862 
Region = Southeast 3.3725 0.9248 -1.0271 -1.2786 0.5236 -0.5669 
 1.8556 1.6454 0.7596 0.7095 0.3801 0.335 
Region = South 4.9310 5.8141 -1.2757 -0.8403 1.869 1.2284 
 2.1817 1.7822 0.8931 0.7685 0.4469 0.3629 
Constant  29.7167 107.6047 6.7674 13.2174 13.5798 24.6603 
 21.1226 17.2591 8.6465 7.4421 4.3269 3.5144 
Number of Observations 11168 13797 11168 13797 11168 13797 
       
Adjusted R-Squared 0.1064 0.0884 0.0571 0.0696 0.1342 0.0987 






(16) Table B-16, Regressions from table 3, section V-D, Ideology 4 (Right) 
 
Independent Variables Elected Males Elected Females Party Success 
 2000 2004 2000 2004 2000 2004 
Percentage of female candidates 0.4234 0.3196 0.5731 0.4893 0.2710 0.2309 
 0.045 0.0465 0.0218 0.0217 0.0129 0.0115 
Percentage of female candidates2 -0.0123 -0.0091 -0.0038 -0.003 -0.0039 -0.0032 
 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
Student per teacher -0.1405 -0.2364 -0.0254 -0.0153 -0.0713 -0.1010 
 0.0696 0.0904 0.0355 0.0421 0.0209 0.0224 
GDP per capita -0.0011 -0.1334 -0.0414 -0.0163 -0.0551 -0.0433 
 0.064 0.0839 0.0310 0.0391 0.0183 0.0208 
Average Schooling – male 0.0492 -4.2851 -3.1251 -0.2171 0.6267 -3.8601 
 4.3318 5.7058 2.3208 2.6607 1.3694 1.4149 
Average Schooling – female 2.4972 5.7789 2.3943 1.7557 0.3540 4.3881 
 4.103 5.3952 2.2195 2.5159 1.3096 1.3378 
Percentage of Women in Municipality 0.2041 -1.6729 -0.2744 -0.8110 -0.5777 -0.5944 
 0.3553 0.3981 0.1810 0.1856 0.1068 0.0987 
Percentage of Catholics in Municipality  0.2987 0.0208 0.0606 -0.0044 0.0765 0.0365 
 0.0686 0.0819 0.0346 0.0382 0.0204 0.0203 
Percentage of Protestants in Municipality 0.2107 -0.2295 -0.0568 -0.1312 -0.0497 -0.0767 
 0.1105 0.1351 0.0600 0.0630 0.0354 0.0335 
District Magnitude 0.5291 0.5846 -0.0743 -0.0404 -0.4011 -0.2129 
 0.1327 0.2045 0.0621 0.0954 0.0367 0.0507 
Vaccine pc -1.5467 -0.0188 -0.4950 -0.212 -0.0827 -0.3097 
 1.0947 2.1276 0.5428 0.9922 0.3203 0.5276 
Infant Mortality pc 4100.00 861.6888 -0.9838 2000 308.4972 456.2854 
 1400.00 1800.00 707.1757 843.3271 417.2813 448.4404 
Expenditure in Education per capita -0.0024 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 
 0.0011 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
Expenditure in Health per capita 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
Region = Northeast -5.0702 5.0336 1.7139 3.0944 4.2934 2.6379 
 1.8745 2.1206 0.9489 0.9889 0.5599 0.5258 
Region = North -1.9788 0.9794 0.7348 1.4517 0.5907 0.3261 
 1.9295 2.1348 1.0022 0.9955 0.5914 0.5294 
Region = Southeast -3.2364 0.1718 -0.5878 -1.0541 0.2693 0.0103 
 1.5692 1.8687 0.8094 0.8714 0.4776 0.4634 
Region = South -1.061 -6.8523 0.0653 -0.4736 -0.4942 -2.2016 
 1.8365 2.0468 0.9802 0.9545 0.5784 0.5076 
Constant  -5.4266 133.8810 12.7349 37.7556 35.9862 38.2652 
 17.7198 19.9356 9.0253 9.2965 5.3255 4.9434 
Number of Observations 11453 10173 11453 10173 11453 10173 
       








       
